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would seem that now the court must look only to the fault of the
employer. The employer may actually be no more at fault than
where consumers quit buying his products, forcing him to cut back
labor costs where nevertheless the employee is allowed to recover
benefits. See, Simrell, Employer Fault vs. General Welfare as a
Basis of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L. J. 181 (1945).
This type of legislation compels the worker to serve under the
penalty of forfeiting certain benefits granted to all workers by law.
The employer can virtually say "This job is inconvenient. Your
own domestic situation, or your health or other good causes counsel that you should abandon this job, but if you do, you will be
deprived of the benefits which now under the law go to all workers
who are without fault unemployed." Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. Board of Review, (Ill. C. C. Cook County, 1941 [quoted 55
IArx L. J. 158 (1945)]).
Another seeming inconsistency is that if a worker quits to preserve his health he is denied benefits. However, if unemployed,
he may refuse to accept unsuitable work and still retain benefits.
"In determining whether work is suitable for an individual, the
director shall consider:
(1) the degree of risk involved to the
individual's health, safety, and morals." W. VA. CODE c. 21A, art.
6, §5 (Michie, 1943). There is no reason why a worker should
be allowed benefits if he refuses to acc pt work which will endanger his health when he is forced tw suffer disqualification
penalties when he quits work to preserve his health. Fannon v.
bederal Cartridge Co., supra.

J.ILH.

WiLs-TniE FOR CONTEST-ADMISSION TO PROBATE OF NONTESTAMENTARY INSTRuMNT.-Decedent died in Monongalia County,

leaving an unwitnessed, typewritten testamentary paper signed by
him, naming his wife as sole beneficiary. In an ex parte proceeding,
the county clerk of that county admitted this paper to probate on
December 27, 1944, and an order confirming probate was entered
on December 28, 1944. W. VA. CODE c. 41, art. 5, §11 (Michie,
1948) provides that, "After a judgment or order entered as aforesaid in a proceeding for probate 6x parte, any person interested who
was not a party to the proceeding.. .may proceed by a bill in equity
to impeach or establish the will... and if the judgment or order

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1949

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [1949], Art. 12
CASE COMMENTS
was entered by the county court and there was no appeal therefrom,
such bill shall be filed within two years from the date of such order
of the county court. If no such bill be filed within the time prescribed, the judgment or order shall be forever binding." Plaintiff,
decedent's half-brother, after acquiring the interest of all others
who, in the event of intestacy, would have been decedent's heirs
at law, brought a proceeding on April 29, 1948, primarily seeking
to partition certain land of which decedent died seised. The
Circuit Court of Monongalia County certified the following pertinent questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals: 1. Was the
writing a will under the laws of West Virginia? 2. Were the
probate proceedings by the county court illegal? 3. Did the probate proceedings, after a lapse of more than two years, have the
effect of vesting title in the beneficiary under the instrument? Held,
that apart from the probate proceedings, the instrument was not
a valid will, but that the probate proceedings were legally effective
to establish the paper as the will of the decedent and that the
paper did vest title to the real estate of which he died seised in
the beneficiary. Cowan v. Cowan, 54 S.E.2d 34 (W. Va. 1949).
The court did not distinguish between the probate of a paper
which, on its face, was not validly executed or attested, and one
which, though properly executed, is sought to be impeached on
extrinsic grounds. Some courts have drawn this distinction and
have concluded that where the defective execution appears on the
face of the instrument, the decree or judgment of probate is an
absolute nullity and subject to collateral attack. Blacksher v.
Northrup, 176 Ala. 190, 57 So. 743 (1911); Fortnerv. Wiggins, 121
Ga. 26, 48 S.E. 694 (1904); Wall v. Wall, 123 Pa. 545, 16 Atl. 598
(1888). This view is based on the theory that under such circumstances the court is without jurisdiction to probate the purported
will. Illustrative of this position is Blacksher v. Northrup, supra,
where the court stated that the probate court "has jurisdiction to
probate wills, but not to convert something that the laws says is
not a will into a will, and thus nullify, or in effect, amend or repeal,
our statutes."
However, in interpreting our statute, the West Virginia court
did not accept this view. Our court chose to adopt the position
taken in several early Virginia cases, that an order admitting a
will to probate is conclusive on all persons, and cannot be ques-
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tioned except in the method prescribed by the statute. Nalle's
Representatives v. Fenwick, 4 Rand. 585 (Va. 1826); Vaughan v.
Doe ex dem. Green, 1 Leigh 287 (Va. 1829); Parker's Ex'rs v.
Brown's Ex'rs, 6 Gratt. 554 (Va. 1850); Schultz v. Schultz, 10 Gratt.
1,58 (Va. 1853). A court of equity has no inherent jurisdiction to
entertain a suit brought to impeach a will formally probated. Its
jurisdiction is conferred by the statute hereinbefore referred to and
the two-year time limitation prescribed therein is a limitation on
the right as well as the remedy. McKinley v. Queen, 125 W. Va.
619, 25 S. E.2d 763 (1943). One eminent writer expresses the
view that "from the earliest decisions to the latest, in both states,
there has been one unbroken current of authority to maintain the
unimpeachable character collaterally of a probate procedure."
1 HARRISON, W"ILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN VIRGINIA AND WEST
VIRGINIA §157 (1927). The principal case is the latest West Virginia
decision in accord with what seemingly is the better, as well as
majority, view.

ATKINSON, WILS §184 (1937); 57 AM. JUR. 619

(1948).
It is submitted that the decision is sound, not only from the
standpoint of statutory construction, but also as respects public
policy. The plain purpose of the statute was first to accelerate
and then to stabilize the settlement of estates of decedents.
McKinley v. Queen, supra. The two-year period allowed by the
statute certainly grants persons interested in the distribution of
the estate sufficient time to have their claims adjudicated. The
significance of the principal case stems largely from the court's
(Italics
statement that "viewed alone it is not a valid will."
added). This statement implies that an additional factor was
necessary. That factor was supplied by the action of the county
court in admitting the paper to probate and the subsequent lapse
of more than two years without contest. The decision indicates
that any interested person desiring to impeach the instrument, and
the probate proceedings incident thereto, must institute his Suit
within the two-year statutory period, or be forever bound by the
action of the county court. The only apparent exception to this
requirement is taken from the court's language that the decision
would not "apply to a probate procured by fraud."
E.G. R.
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